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Shareholder value maximization: 
What managers say and what they do 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether Swiss firms maximize shareholder 
value.  To find out, we survey the goals of 313 listed and unlisted 
firms.  We then examine whether managers’ decisions are 
consistent with their goals and analyze whether performance 
corresponds to intentions.  Our results show that most managers 
pursue conflicting targets.  Many also declare that they do not 
maximize shareholder value.  And those who claim they do 
sometimes rely on investment criteria that are inconsistent with 
that target.  Finally, we find that share-price performance is 
marginally better when managers claim to maximize shareholder 
value, particularly when stock prices have fallen. 
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Shareholder value maximization: 
What managers say and what they do 
 
1. Introduction 
In many industrialized nations, there is a serious controversy about the purpose of 
the corporation involving the media, economists, policymakers, and managers 
(Jensen, 2001).  The question is that of the appropriate target or, as Jensen puts it, the 
scorecard that would allow managers to distinguish what is better from what is worse.  
Ultimately, the dispute is about whether the corporation should maximize value for 
shareholders or for stakeholders—or, in many ways, about corporate social 
responsibility.1  
This paper examines whether the managers of Swiss corporations pursue 
shareholder value maximization.  To find out, we first ask managers directly.  
Second, we examine whether they use investment criteria consistent with the goal of 
maximizing shareholder value.  Finally, we investigate whether stock-price 
performance corresponds to intentions.   
In Switzerland, the notion that firms ought to maximize shareholder value appears 
to be particularly divisive, possibly because of the comparatively low mobility of the 
population.  Low mobility means closer relationships and more frequent opportunities 
to compare one’s financial success with that of friends and acquaintances.  To prevent 
envy and jealousy, society therefore seems to sanction the open accumulation and 
public display of wealth, and to encourage its sharing.  That could also explain why 
so many people resist the notion that corporations should focus on creating 
shareholder value, and why they associate shareholder value maximization with greed 
and expropriation.2  
                                                 
1 Stakeholders are usually understood to include shareholders, debtholders, employees, customers, 
suppliers, the government, and the environment.  The Stanford Research Institute defines 
stakeholders as “those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist” (cited 
in Freeman (1984), 31).   
2 The chairman of the board of Vontobel Holding, a listed bank, stated at the 1996 shareholder 
meeting that shareholder value maximization generally occurs at the expense of other stakeholders 
in the firm.  Moreover, he remarked that all those who idealize shareholder value undermine the 
foundations of society.  See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 19, 1996, 28. 
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As it turns out, shareholder value maximization is a hotly debated issue in other 
German-speaking countries as well, and in Germany in particular.3  The origins of the 
controversy can be documented as far back as the start of the twentieth century, when 
the science of management had its beginnings.  According to Schmalenbach, for 
example, the purpose of this science is not to focus on the interests of the providers of 
capital but rather on how firms establish their social productivity.  The current 
skepticism about shareholder value maximization is reinforced by the fact that, under 
German law, employee representatives are entitled to sit on the firms’ governing 
boards.4  This skepticism is also reflected in German jurisprudence in general: the 
firm’s interests are generally interpreted as being the interests of all parties with a 
stake (in the general sense of the term) in the firm. 
The heart of the debate on whether management should run the corporation solely 
in the interests of shareholders has been the U.S.  Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2002) 
trace the origins of the academic debate to the first writings on corporate governance 
(see Berle, 1931, and Dodd, 1932).  But the question of corporate social responsibility 
is as old as the corporation itself, and the answer to that question has swung back and 
forth from freedom from any obligation other than to obey the law to the requirement 
that companies pursue the interests of their stakeholders, notably those of the state 
(see Economist.com, 2002).  Although Anglo-Saxon companies are believed to be 
less constrained than European or Japanese companies to pursue the interests of their 
shareholders, de facto they face many impediments to do so.  In the late 1980s, for 
instance, more than half of America’s state legislatures adopted “other constituency” 
statutes that allow directors to consider the interests of all their stakeholders, not just 
shareholders; Connecticut even passed a law requiring them to do this 
(Economist.com, 2002).5  “It appears that when forced to choose, managers and 
shareholders alike—as well as most judges and legislators—generally opt for rules 
that favor director primacy over rules that favor shareholder primacy” (Stout, 2002, 
1202).   
                                                 
3  The following information is taken from Wagner (1997). 
4  For an analysis of codetermination in Germany, see, for instance, Benelli, Loderer, and Lys (1987).   
5  “Delaware gives directors free rein to pursue strategies that reduce shareholder wealth while 
benefiting other constituencies.  Thus, directors can use earnings to raise employees' wages rather 
than to declare a dividend; they can “reprice” executive stock options even when share prices are 
falling; they can retroactively increase retirees' pension benefits; and they can donate corporate 
funds to charity” (Stout, 2002, 1202-1203).   
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Unlike in the US, however, the shareholder value maximization debate in 
German-speaking countries is often ideological, and beliefs are rarely corroborated by 
facts.6  This paper provides some of the facts.  It is organized as follows.  Section 2 
briefly describes the experiment.  Section 3 discusses the sample of corporations 
surveyed and documents response rates and associated descriptive statistics.  Sections 
4–6 present the results. 
Specifically, Section 4 surveys managers’ preferences.  Surprisingly, managers 
mention maximization of shareholder value as a goal only about half of the time, and 
when they do, it is often because share prices have fallen.  We also observe that 
managers give answers that are logically inconsistent by claiming to pursue 
competing targets at the same time.   
Section 5 then examines what criteria managers use when making investment 
decisions and what approaches they take to value firms.  The evidence indicates that 
managers who claim to adhere to shareholder value maximization are more likely to 
use a discounted cash flow (DCF) firm-valuation approach.  Shareholder-value 
maximizing managers, however, are not more likely than other managers to rely on 
the net present value (NPV) investment rule.   
Section 6 asks whether managers who say they want to maximize shareholder 
value also achieve superior stock-price performance.  The evidence is marginally 
consistent with that claim, particularly when stock prices have fallen.  Finally, section 
7 draws the conclusions.   
 
2. The experiment 
We rely on a survey of listed and unlisted firms in Switzerland and conduct a 
three-pronged experiment.  We analyze managers’ targets, study their valuation 
metrics, and ask whether share-price performance is better when they pursue 
shareholder value maximization and use the appropriate metrics.  What follows 
explains these points in more detail.   
 
                                                 
6  See, for instance, the discussion in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Dossier Shareholder Value, 1996. 
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2.1. Managerial targets 
The first part of the analysis focuses on the targets that managers say they pursue.  
We inquire in particular into the proportion of firms that claim to maximize 
shareholder wealth.  Moreover, we examine possible logical inconsistencies in these 
claims as well as differences across firm size and between listed and unlisted firms.  
We ignore the issue of whether shareholder-value maximization makes normative 
sense for shareholders.  Unanimous support for such a policy among shareholders 
requires a competitive capital market that permits Pareto-optimal allocation (Brennan, 
2001). 
 
2.2. Investment criteria and firm-valuation approaches 
The second part of our investigation reviews the criteria managers use when 
deciding what projects to invest in and when valuing firms.  We examine whether 
firms that evaluate investment projects on an NPV basis also take a discounted cash 
flow (DCF) approach when valuing firms.  Since both methods compute value on the 
basis of discounted future cash flows, logical consistency requires that firms that 
apply the NPV criterion also rely on a DCF approach. 
Furthermore, we investigate whether firms that claim to maximize shareholder 
value also use NPV and DCF in their decisions.  The reason to expect such a tie is that 
both NPV and DCF help firms identify the investment projects with the greatest value 
added for the firm.  Both metrics help managers maximize firm value.  And since in 
efficient capital markets the NPV of investments or acquisitions accrues in large part 
to shareholders, a policy of firm-value maximization maps into a policy of 
shareholder value maximization.7  
 
                                                 
7  The exceptions to this rule are cases in which the claims of other parties to the firm (for instance, 
those of debtholders) are very risky.  In those cases, it can be preferable for shareholders to engage 
in wealth redistribution from other stakeholders even if that means engaging in negative NPV 
projects (and therefore dissipating firm value).  As a first approximation, however, these cases 
involve mainly firms in financial distress (see, for instance, the discussion in Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, and Myers, 1977).   Thus, in most cases, the policies of shareholder and firm value 
maximization coincide, which means that a policy of shareholder value maximization also requires 
the adoption of the NPV and DCF metrics.    
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2.3. Share-price performance 
The third part of the analysis asks whether the firms of managers who claim to 
maximize shareholder value and use the appropriate valuation metrics also experience 
better share-price performance.  To gauge whether managers add to shareholder 
value, we have to establish whether shareholders’ wealth grows faster over time than 
would be required to compensate them for the risk they bear and the time value of 
money.  We therefore measure share-price performance with the abnormal or excess 
returns experienced by the stockholders of a particular firm during a given period.  
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is our theoretical benchmark in that 
computation.  Abnormal returns are defined as deviations of stock returns from that 
benchmark.   
Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation over the relevant time 
period: 
 
 ( ) itFtMtiiFtit εRRβαRR +−×+=− , (1) 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
 
itR  = the continuously compounded rate of return on the stock of firm i 
during month t; 
FtR  = the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return during month t; 
MtR  = the continuously compounded rate of return on the market portfolio 
during month t.  As a proxy for this variable, we choose the Morgan 
Stanley Composite Index Europe 15 (MSCI-E 15); 
 
itε  = a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed error term with zero mean 
and constant variance; 
iα  and iβ  = the regression intercept and slope coefficients, respectively. 
 
If firm i experiences stock-price performance systematically above or below that 
predicted by the CAPM during a particular period, its intercept coefficient αi will be 
significantly different from zero.  We perform the estimation with the robust 
regression approach implemented in Stata 7.8  Robustness is with respect to the 
distribution assumptions of the error term.   
                                                 
8  StataCorp. 2001.  Stata Statistical Software: Release 7.0.  College Station, TX: Stata Corporation. 
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Compared with other measures of managerial performance that rely on accounting 
information, excess stock returns have the merit of capitalizing the impact of 
management decisions on the firm’s future cash flows.  The implicit assumption is 
that the stock market is able to compute values correctly on average.   
The drawback of abnormal returns is that they reflect investors’ expectations.  In 
other words, they capture the impact on share prices of changes in investors’ 
expectations rather than the impact of managerial performance per se.  As a 
consequence, a positive αi simply means that the firm has performed better than 
expected, but it is not clear what those expectations were.  They could have been very 
optimistic or very pessimistic.  If expectations were high, a positive αi would imply 
truly exceptional performance.  Otherwise, a positive αi could reflect poor 
performance, though better than feared.  To mitigate the expectations problem, we 
estimate the regression equation (1) over longer periods.  The rationale for doing so is 
that, if we assume corrective mechanisms discipline underperforming managers, then 
over the medium to long term, firms can be expected to perform equally well.  If so, a 
positive αi measures good performance in relation to a set of expectations that are 
similar across firms.  Thus, firms with a positive αi are firms that have performed well 
in relation to the rest of the firms in the sample.   
 
3. Sample characteristics 
We sent the questionnaire in the fall of 1998 to the 2,035 firms reported on the 
Top 2000 CD-ROM published in 1998 by Handelszeitung, a business weekly.9  Of 
these firms, 184 were listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange and 1,851 were not.  To 
ensure an adequate response, we sent a reminder to all firms (listed firms received two 
reminders).  Three hundred and forty-six firms eventually filled out the questionnaire 
by the end of 1998, for a 17% response rate.  Of those, we dropped 33 companies 
because they did not have the legal form of the private corporation.  The remaining 
313 companies make up our sample, with the following breakdown: 75 listed firms 
(response rate of 41%) and 238 unlisted ones (response rate of 15%).  The listed firms 
include large multinationals such as Credit Suisse, Nestlé, Novartis, Swiss Re, UBS, 
and Zürich Financial.   
                                                 
9  The reader will notice that, in spite of its name, the disk contains more than 2,000 companies. 
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The sample is not clustered in any one industry, even though most of the 
companies are in the wholesale, electronics, banking, machinery, and food industries.  
As for the composition of the sample by size, 33% of the firms are large, 55% 
medium sized, and 12% small.  Small firms have fewer than 50 employees, medium-
sized firms between 50 and 499, and large firms 500 or more.  Firms have an average 
of 1,010 employees, and a median of 270.  This compares with an average of 2,723 
employees in listed firms (with a median of 1,095) and an average of 475 employees 
in unlisted firms (with a median of 200).   
Generally, at least according to the information they provided, fairly high-ranking 
officers or directors in the firm filled out the questionnaire.  That is, a member of the 
board of directors in 10% of the cases; a senior manager in 40%; the chief financial 
officer, the controller, or the treasurer in 43%; and someone else in the firm in the 
remaining 7% of the cases.  Most of these people should have had the information 
needed to answer the questions we were asking.   
 
4. What managers say: The evidence 
Table 1 compiles the answers that managers give when asked whether or not they 
pursue a given target.  Cases with no answer are ignored.  Consequently, when the 
table shows that a given percentage π of firms pursues a given target, this also means 
that a percentage (1–π) does not pursue that particular target.   
 
((insert Table 1)) 
 
Before discussing the numbers in the table, we should point out that the target of 
shareholder value maximization is stated conditional on not expropriating other 
stakeholders in the firm.  This version of shareholder value maximization is consistent 
with equilibrium, since all expectations of the firm’s contracting parties are met.  It is 
the target typically assumed in finance theory and the one that corporations would 
pursue in frictionless markets.  If (a) securities are traded, (b) transaction costs are 
reasonably low, and (c) asymmetries of information between managers and investors 
are limited, then managers who do not maximize shareholder value create an 
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incentive for investors to take over their firms and install new managers willing to 
maximize shareholder value (Manne, 1965).10 
According to the table, the answers are similar regardless of whether the firms are 
traded.  The only exception concerns the maximization of shareholder value.  We will 
come back to that exception.  Let us first focus on the answers of the full sample of 
firms.  Almost all firms (96%) want to maximize customer satisfaction (4% state that 
they do not);11  a sizable fraction (81%) wants to maximize stakeholder value 
(stakeholders include shareholders, employees, customers, and the environment); an 
equally sizable fraction (79%) wants to maintain independence; and two thirds (68%) 
intend to maximize profits.  Moreover, more than half of the firms say they want to 
maximize shareholder value as long as this does not come at the expense of other 
stakeholders in the firm.12  
We should note the fundamental difference between the notions of shareholder 
and stakeholder value maximization, as defined here, even if in either case there is a 
reference to firm stakeholders.  In the case of shareholder value maximization, the 
implicit or explicit contracts with other stakeholders have to be met in the 
maximization attempt.  These contracts, and therefore the interests of the involved 
stakeholders, represent maximization constraints.  In contrast, in the case of 
stakeholder value maximization, the interests of these stakeholders are part of the 
target function itself.  The problem with the latter target is that, since the interests of 
the various parties in the firm are competing, it is not clear how they can be 
maximized at the same time.  All else being equal, for instance, lower prices make 
consumers better off and higher salaries benefit employees and managers, yet both 
reduce shareholder value.  The stakeholder value maximization target is therefore a 
logical impossibility.   
There are two things to stress about these answers.  First, many firms pursue 
different, mostly conflicting targets at the same time.13 Second, there is no apparent 
                                                 
10  Shareholders are generally residual claimants because they can diversify risk more efficiently than 
other stakeholders in the firm. 
11  We do not mean this literally.  Organizations per se do not pursue goals.  It is the individuals in 
those organizations who do.   
12  The questionnaire also asked whether managers pursue shareholder value unconditionally.  Less 
than one third (28%) of the respondents gave an affirmative answer. 
13  The finding of multiple targets is consistent with what companies say in their mission statements.  
These statements typically mention the importance, without providing any ranking, of the welfare 
of employees, customer satisfaction, shareholder wealth, and the environment. 
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evidence that the public debate mentioned above puts pressure on managers to 
misstate their preference for shareholder value maximization.  We consider these two 
issues in some detail in the following two subsections.  Given the length of the 
discussion, we then summarize and interpret our findings in a third subsection.   
 
4.1. Pursuing multiple targets simultaneously 
Managers claim to pursue multiple targets simultaneously.  For instance, they 
apparently maximize customer satisfaction, stakeholder value, and profits while at the 
same time striving to maintain independence.  Since most of these targets are not 
positively and monotonically related, these preferences are logically inconsistent.  The 
phenomenon of multiple objectives has been noted before (see, among others, Jensen, 
Wruck, and Barry, 1991, and Cools and van Praag, 2000).14  Table 2 documents how 
many targets any one firm allegedly pursues.  In this calculation, we include all the 
targets reported in Table 1. 
 
((insert Table 2)) 
 
According to the table, 95% of the firms pursue at least two targets, and 19% 
pursue all six targets.  Since logical inconsistencies could be a characteristic of 
smaller, less sophisticated firms, we replicate the analysis for the sample of listed 
firms.  We would expect listed firms to give more logical answers.  Yet the numbers 
reveal essentially the same picture: 93% of the firms that are listed indicate at least 
two maximization targets, and 21% pursue all six targets at once.15  
The logical inconsistency of simultaneously pursuing mutually exclusive targets is 
particularly evident when we restrict our attention to the targets of shareholder and 
                                                 
14  The targets examined in Cools and van Praag’s survey of 80 large listed Dutch firms include: (1) 
financial accounting targets (e.g., net profit per share, ROA, or ROE); (2) financial value-based 
targets (e.g., shareholder value, or EVA); (3) growth-based targets; (4) operational targets (e.g., 
credit rating, or product quality); and (5) social targets (e.g., corporate governance, transparency, or 
social responsibility).  In comparison, the targets we are interested in are mostly indications of what 
group of claimholders managers intend to benefit with their efforts.  Moreover, we focus 
specifically on “maximization.”  Both aspects of our investigation make it easier to assess logical 
inconsistencies in what managers say and, possibly, do. 
15  The inability to make more precise indications could be interpreted as measurement error for the 
“true” goal.  If so, using these indications as independent variables in our subsequent regressions 
induces an attenuation bias in the slope coefficient estimates and reduces the statistical significance 
of those estimates.   
page 12 
stakeholder value maximization.  Maximization of stakeholder value, assuming this is 
possible, is inconsistent with maximization of shareholder value.  Managers do not 
seem to realize this contradiction.  As shown in the two-way contingency table 
reported in Table 3, 62% (=133/215) of the managers who claim to maximize 
stakeholder value also adhere to a policy of shareholder value maximization.  In 
contrast, only 32% (=18/57) of the managers who do not maximize stakeholder value 
also claim to maximize shareholder value.  Thus, it would seem that managers who 
disclose a preference for stakeholder value maximization also have a preference for 
shareholder value maximization.  According to the χ2−test of independence reported 
in the table, the two classifications of firms are not independent with confidence better 
than 0.99.   
 
((insert Table 3)) 
 
4.2. Managerial targets and political correctness 
As mentioned above, the second regularity to note about Table 1 is that there is no 
apparent evidence that considerations of political correctness induce managers to 
misrepresent their preference for the goal of shareholder value maximization.  As 
pointed out in the introduction, the media often associate the notion of shareholder 
value maximization with greed.  This standpoint could pressure managers to shy away 
from advocating the maximization of shareholder value.  Yet we find little apparent 
evidence that this pressure, if any, is effective.  There are two reasons to say so.   
The first reason is that managers have no apparent qualms about saying that they 
maximize profits, a measure of the benefits shareholders reap in the firm.  If managers 
were concerned about being politically correct, they would probably be reluctant to 
list profit maximization as a goal.  In fact, about two thirds of the managers who fill 
out the questionnaire are willing to state that they do maximize profits.  The second 
reason is that, if managers were concerned about being politically correct, we would 
expect those of listed firms to be more hesitant to disclose an intention to maximize 
shareholder value.  The assumption, of course, is that these managers have the 
greatest political exposure—after all, they are the ones the media are more likely to 
cover.  Yet, when we look at the sample of listed firms we observe, if anything, the 
opposite tendency.  According to Table 1, listed firms are more likely to mention 
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shareholder value maximization as their target.  Specifically, 75% of the listed firms 
indicate shareholder value maximization, compared with 57% in the full sample.16  It 
could be that, since listed firms have cheaper access to the capital market for equity 
funding than unlisted firms, they face a stronger incentive to identify with the goal of 
shareholder value maximization.  Still, it is difficult on the basis of these results to 
make the argument that managers fabricate their preference for shareholder value 
maximization for political convenience.   
The relations we have seen so far are univariate.  They could therefore be 
spurious.  To find out, we reexamine the relevant relations in a multivariate context.  
The relations are tested with the help of logistic regressions.  The dependent variable 
is bSHAREMAX, a binary variable equal to 1 if managers claim they maximize 
shareholder value, and equal to 0 otherwise.17  Table 4 reports the results.  Its 
individual columns illustrate the regression coefficients for different samples or 
different regression specifications.   
 
((insert Table 4)) 
 
Column (1) refers to the full sample.  The first coefficient estimate refers to the 
variable bSTAKEMAX, a binary variable that identifies firms whose managers 
disclose a stakeholder value maximization target.  The coefficient of bSTAKEMAX is 
positive and significant with confidence better than 0.99.  This means that shareholder 
value maximization is more likely if managers also say they maximize stakeholder 
value.  We pointed out this logical inconsistency before, and it does not go away in a 
multivariate context.  The results also show that the probability of shareholder value 
maximization is larger if the firm is listed (as measured by the binary variable 
bLISTED).  This is in line with what we saw in Table 1.  Firm size, however, as 
measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s employees (LNSIZE), has no impact 
on the propensity to maximize shareholder value.   
                                                 
16  There are also more managers who state a preference for unconditional shareholder value 
maximization in listed firms than in the full sample (40% vs.  27%).  For simplicity, we do not 
expand on these results. 
17  The letter ‹b› in front of the respective acronym similarly identifies all binary variables in the 
following analysis.  In all cases, the variable equals 1 if managers claim that something applies or if 
a certain condition occurs, and equals 0 otherwise.   
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To interpret the coefficients in the table, let us examine the one associated with 
the variable bLISTED, which identifies listed firms.  Its value of 0.849 means that if a 
firm is listed, the odds ratio that its managers will say they maximize shareholder 
value gets multiplied by exp(0.849) = 2.34.  Consequently, suppose the probability of 
shareholder value maximization in otherwise identical but unlisted firms were 0.6, for 
an odds ratio of 0.6/(1–0.6) = 1.5.  From our results, listed firms would have an 
average odds ratio of 51.334.25.1 =× , meaning that the probability of shareholder 
value maximization in these firms would be about 0.78.18  
Column (2) repeats the analysis for the listed firms.  A quick look at the numbers 
shows that no variable except firm size has a significant coefficient.  In particular, 
there is no relation between stakeholder and shareholder value maximization.  
Column (3) extends the analysis with the inclusion of a binary variable 
(bCLOSELYHELD95), which measures the presence of a controlling shareholder in 
1995.19  The coefficient associated with bCLOSELYHELD95 is positive and 
significantly different from zero, indicating that firms with a controlling shareholder 
are more likely to say they maximize shareholder value.  This suggests that, at least in 
their statements, managers identify with the presumable interests of the controlling 
shareholder.  Note also that with this specification, the coefficient of bSTAKEMAX 
becomes marginally significant in a one-sided test of significance.   
Whether or not managers identify with the goal of shareholder value 
maximization depends on the incentives they face.  Conceivably, if the company’s 
stock price performance has been negative, they face more pressure to care about 
shareholder value and take corrective measures.  Financial analysts and shareholders 
might otherwise ask embarrassing questions, or the firm might become an interesting 
takeover candidate.  We therefore extend the analysis of column (3) and investigate 
the significance of past stock price performance, as measured by the change in the 
company’s stock price.  Specifically, we include the variable RETPOS among the 
regression arguments.  RETPOS measures the company’s stock return during the 
period January 1990–December 1995 if that return is positive; otherwise, RETPOS is 
                                                 
18  Denoting the probability of shareholder value maximization by π, the equation 51.31 =π−
π  implies 
π=0.78. 
19  The variable bSTAKEMAX was originally collected for the stock price performance analysis.  That 
analysis covers the period 1.1996–12.2001, which is why the variable in question refers to 1995 and 
not to 1998, the year of the survey.   
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equal to 0.  Similarly, we include the variable RETNEG, which is similarly defined as 
RETPOS except for being equal to the negative stock return.  When we estimate this 
specification, the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficients of the 
variables in the original specification in column (3) remain the same (not shown).  As 
for the new variables, they appear to be significantly related to managers’ preferences.  
The coefficient of RETPOS, for instance, is positive and significant with confidence 
better than 0.95.  All else being equal, larger stock price increases raise the odds of 
managers saying they maximize shareholder value.  This could either reflect properly 
working corporate governance or an attempt on the part of managers to take credit for 
higher stock prices after the fact.  More importantly, RETNEG has a negative, 
marginally significant coefficient with confidence 0.90 in a one-sided test of 
significance (not shown).  The more negative the return, the stronger the identification 
with shareholder value maximization.  The coefficients on the two variables RETPOS 
and RETNEG imply a v-shaped relation between stock returns and the likelihood that 
managers embrace shareholder value maximization.   
Column (4) of the table exhibits the estimates of a slightly different specification 
than the one we just discussed, namely one in which we switch RETNEG with the 
dummy variable bRETNEG, which equals 1 if the company’s stock return is negative 
during the five-year period January 1990–December 1995, and equals 0 otherwise.  
As one can see, all the variables reported in column (3) maintain their sign and 
significance.  The statistical significance of the impact of negative returns on 
managers’ preferences, however, increases when we measure them with the variable 
bRETNEG.  Its coefficient is positive and significant with confidence better than 
0.95, consistent with the hypothesis that managers come under pressure to care about 
shareholder value when stock prices drop.  The coefficient of RETPOS remains 
positive and significant.  We can visualize the relation between managers’ 
identification with shareholder value maximization and stock price changes with a 
horizontal line (with a positive intercept) as long as returns are negative, and an 
upward sloping straight line (through the intercept) when they are positive.  It is not 
clear in what direction, if any, causality runs, particularly in the case of positive stock 
returns.  But if we assume that returns affect managers’ preferences, the relation we 
find is that a negative return has a constant impact on managers’ preferences; in 
contrast, the impact of a positive return depends on the return’s magnitude.  When 
stock prices do not increase much, the incentive to embrace shareholder value 
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maximization is much weaker than when they fall.  As it turns out, prices have to 
increase by 58% (= 2.989/5.120) for the effect of higher prices to equal that of lower 
prices (both changes measured over a five-year period).   
Finally, column (5) duplicates the regression specification of column (2) for the 
unlisted firms.  Again, the results confirm what we argued in connection with Table 3, 
namely that the logical inconsistency of trying to simultaneously maximize both 
shareholder and stakeholder value is driven mainly by the subsample of unlisted 
firms.  The coefficient of the variable bSTAKEMAX is significant with confidence 
higher than 0.99. 
 
4.3. Summary  
Overall, we find that, when asked about their targets, managers typically mention 
several contradictory goals.  In unlisted firms, managers even profess to maximize 
both shareholder and stakeholder value at the same time (Table 4).  We also uncover 
evidence that the identification with shareholder value maximization increases when 
stock prices fall.  It is not clear why managers allegedly pursue multiple, conflicting 
targets.  They may not understand the implications of what they say.  Or, they may 
think that, by mentioning several targets, they can limit the embarrassment of saying 
something wrong.  In either case, the answers reveal a fundamental insecurity and 
consequently an inability to set clear priorities.  Of course, we may not have listed the 
relevant target in the question we asked, thus inducing people to cross the possibilities 
we presented.  Yet we gave managers the choice of completing the list of possible 
targets.  Several managers used this opportunity.  Although several possibilities were 
listed,20 none was mentioned by more than 13% of the respondents.  Thus there is 
little reason to believe that they were somehow trapped into giving the answers we 
received.   
Yet another interpretation of why managers indicate multiple targets is that 
managers may misinterpret the term maximization.  Maximization of customer 
satisfaction, for instance, may simply be taken to mean, “making sure that the 
customer is satisfied.” Similarly, maximization of stakeholder value might be 
interpreted as “taking into account the interests of stakeholders.” This latter 
                                                 
20  Managers indicated things such as securing the firm’s survival, being an attractive employer, 
increasing customers’ utility, and guaranteeing jobs.   
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interpretation should probably be dismissed because, when asked whether they 
maximize shareholder value unconditionally, less than one third of the managers in 
the sample say they do (not shown in Table 1).  In contrast, had they meant, “making 
sure the shareholders are satisfied,” a large majority would probably have agreed.  
Still another possible interpretation of the results is that managers may lack the proper 
incentives to pursue any one particular target.  This would suggest a malfunctioning 
corporate governance system.   
One final reason why managers may pursue several (conflicting) targets at the 
same time could be managerial overconfidence.  According to this hypothesis, 
managers are so self-confident that they think they can achieve the impossible.  There 
are observations that overconfidence can lead to illogical statements.  For example, a 
large majority of drivers think of themselves as above average drivers (Shefrin, 2001).   
The tendency of managers to pursue different targets simultaneously complicates 
the interpretation in the following analysis.  As mentioned in the introduction, we 
examine whether shareholder value maximizing managers make logically consistent 
decisions.  We also investigate whether these managers actually create more 
shareholder value than other managers.  The problem is that, given the tendency to 
pursue different targets at the same time, it is not clear what managers who state that 
they maximize shareholder value really do maximize.21 We can, however, take their 
answers at face value when they say they do not pursue that target.   
We also observe that a substantial number of managers, particularly in unlisted 
firms, are willing to go on record as not pursuing the target of shareholder value 
maximization.  More than half of the firms that are not listed and almost one quarter 
of those that are come out and say so.  This would seem to represent the paradoxical 
case of an agency relation in which the agent openly declares that he intends to make 
decisions that are not in the principal’s interests.   
Why do so many managers, particularly in unlisted firms, fail to identify with the 
goal of shareholder value maximization?  One possibility is that they do not properly 
understand the issues involved and are confused by the many contradictory reports 
they receive from the media and some academics on the subject.  Another, not 
exclusive possibility is that the notion of shareholder value might not mean much in 
                                                 
21  As it turns out, they also focus on the following targets: 99% of them want to maximize customer 
satisfaction; 82% aspire to maintain independence; 88% maximize stakeholder value; and 76% 
maximize profits.   
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unlisted firms.  These firms are generally closely held and very jealous of their 
independence.  Short of selling their shares, the most obvious way owner-managers 
can dispose of the economic surplus they generate is to pay themselves higher 
incomes, dividends, and perks.  The notion of shareholder value maximization might 
simply not be relevant.   
A third possibility for why managers are willing to state they do not maximize 
shareholder value is that the control mechanisms to prevent them from straying too far 
from that target might not be working.  In particular, there might be no effective 
pressure from the capital market to behave otherwise, particularly in the case of 
unlisted firms.  The threat of takeover is the main mechanism outside the firm that 
keeps firms from diverging too much from a policy of shareholder value 
maximization.22  Yet, for this device to be effective, some assumptions have to be 
met.  In particular, the firms’ stock must be traded.  That assumption, however, is 
compromised in the case of unlisted firms, which could explain our findings.   
 
5. How managers decide: The evidence 
In this section, we first examine the criteria managers rely on when making 
investment decisions and the approaches they adopt when valuing firms.23  Second, 
we look at whether firms that use an NPV investment criterion also use a DCF firm- 
valuation approach.  Third, we investigate whether firms that maximize shareholder 
value also use the NPV and the DCF metrics.  Finally, we summarize the results. 
 
5.1. Investment valuation criteria 
The questionnaire asks managers to indicate the criterion they ultimately rely on 
when deciding what projects to invest in.  As it turns out, they mostly rely on payback 
and NPV (not shown).24  Almost all (about 80%) employ payback regardless of 
whether or not they are listed.  As for NPV, listed firms use it much more frequently 
                                                 
22  Mechanisms inside the firm include monitoring by the board of directors, appropriate compensation 
packages, and managerial equity participation. 
23  The issue of actual investment efficiency is discussed separately in Jörg, Loderer, and Roth (2003). 
24  They also depend on the internal rate of return (IRR) metric.  We focus on payback and NPV 
because they represent the most divergent criteria.  Additional information concerning the 
investment criteria and the firm valuation approaches employed in the sample firms is in Loderer, 
Jörg, Pichler, Roth, and Zgraggen (2002). 
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than unlisted firms (the associated percentages are about 71% for listed firms and 
42% for firms that are not).25  Further differences become apparent when we sort the 
sample by project size.   
The questionnaire does not provide a specific definition of project size.  What 
constitutes small, medium, and large projects is in the eyes of the responding 
manager.  Listed firms tend to rely comparatively more often on NPV and less often 
on payback than unlisted firms, particularly if the project is large.  In particular, 38% 
of the listed firms use payback in deciding about large projects, compared with 64% 
of the unlisted firms; for small projects, the corresponding proportions are 61% and 
73%.  Similarly, 56% of the listed firms rely on NPV when investing in large projects, 
compared with 32% of the unlisted firms; for small projects, these proportions fall to 
30% and 17%.   
These results make intuitive sense under a shareholder value maximization target.  
On the one hand, small projects can be decided on the basis of payback because it is 
easier to use and the costs of making wrong decisions are low.  When projects are 
large, however, the costs of making mistakes grow larger, and we should observe a 
more frequent use of NPV.  On the other hand, the fact that payback is less often the 
deciding criterion among listed firms than among unlisted ones could reflect greater 
financial sophistication in listed firms.  Alternatively, it could reflect the greater 
difficulties in implementing the NPV criterion (in particular, the difficulties of 
measuring an appropriate discount rate) in unlisted firms.   
Besides inquiring about investment criteria, the questionnaire looks into the 
approaches managers use to value companies.  To limit space, we do not report the 
results in a separate table.  The most popular approach among listed firms is the DCF 
approach; almost 90% of them use it.  In contrast, the approach preferred by unlisted 
firms is the earnings value method, an approach that computes equity value as the 
present value of a perpetual stream of sustainable future earnings; almost 86% of the 
unlisted firms use this method.  Firms also use other methods, including valuing firms 
by aggregating the value of their individual assets: about 55% of the unlisted firms 
and 38% of the listed firms use this method. 
 
                                                 
25  In a survey of CFOs of listed American firms, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that large firms are 
significantly more likely to use NPV techniques than small firms.  They are also significantly less 
likely to use payback.   
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5.2. Relation among valuation criteria  
Having examined the metrics used to value investment projects, we now want to 
ask whether the firms that use the NPV investment criterion also value firms with a 
DCF approach.  The two techniques follow the same logic, which is why we expect a 
correlation.  Table 5 answers the question in a multivariate context with a logistic 
regression.  The dependent variables are binary.  The variable (bNPV) gauges whether 
firms use the NPV criterion, whereas the variable (bNPVLARGE) indicates whether 
NPV is the deciding criterion for large projects.  Numbers in parentheses are 
probability values for two-sided tests of difference from zero.26  The economic 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is similar in principle to that discussed in 
the context of Table 4.  In other words, an increase in the variable in question by one 
unit multiplies the odds ratio that firms use NPV as an investment criterion by an 
amount equal to the constant e raised to the power of the variable’s coefficient. 
 
((insert Table 5)) 
 
Column (1) shows that the likelihood of NPV adoption increases if the firm is 
listed (variable bLISTED) and if it is large (variable LNSIZE).  More importantly, the 
results indicate that firms using a DCF firm valuation approach (as identified by the 
variable bDCFVALUATION) are more likely to use the NPV investment criterion.  
Moreover, the variable bASSETVALUATION has a negative coefficient, which 
indicates that companies that value other firms with the aggregate value of their 
individual assets (as indicated by the variable bASSETVALUATION) are less likely 
to use NPV.  This result is intuitive, since this firm valuation approach is logically 
inconsistent with the NPV approach.  All these relations are significant with 
confidence better than 0.95 in a two-sided test of difference from zero; the exception 
is the coefficient of the variable bLISTED, which is significant with 0.91confidence.  
The table includes coefficient estimates for two other arguments, bSTAKEMAX and 
bSHAREMAX, which we will discuss in the next section. 
Column (2) of the table repeats the regression in column (1) for the sample of 
unlisted firms.  The main message of column (1) remains unaltered: firms that adopt a 
                                                 
26  In some cases, one-sided tests would be more appropriate.  Still, we do not always have clear 
predictions for the sign of the various regression coefficients.  To avoid confusion, we therefore 
always perform two-sided tests of statistical significance. 
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DCF valuation approach are more likely to also use NPV, whereas firms that rely on 
asset value are less likely to do so.  Both relations are statistically significant with 
confidence close to 0.95.  The coefficient of firm size, however, is not significant.   
Column (3) reports the results for the listed firms.  The coefficient estimates show 
that, contrary to what we observe in the full sample, there is no inverse relation 
between the use of asset value in firm valuation (bASSETVALUATION) and the use 
of NPV in listed firms.  The coefficients of the variables bDCFVALUATION and 
LNSIZE, however, remain significant with confidence of at least 0.90.  The finding 
concerning the variable bDCFVALUATION should not be overemphasized, however.  
Almost 90% of the firms that are listed use DCF to value firms.  Thus, there is little 
variation in the variable in question to perform a robust test of the relation between 
the DCF approach and the NPV criterion in listed firms.   
We replicated the analysis by focusing on the use of NPV for large projects.  The 
rationale is that, as discussed above, NPV is used more often for large projects, 
possibly because wrong decisions on these projects have more serious consequences 
for the firm.  We therefore wanted to see whether the same results obtain when 
focusing on situations in which the use of NPV has an unambiguous economic 
justification.  The results (not shown) are qualitatively unchanged.   
 
5.3. Valuation criteria and shareholder value maximization 
The preceding sections have uncovered a fairly strong relation between the use of 
the NPV investment criterion and the DCF approach to firm valuation.  Since both 
methods compute value by discounting expected future cash flows, this relation 
makes logical sense.  As explained in Section 2.2, it makes also economic sense if the 
firm’s target is shareholder value maximization.  Whether in fact there is a positive tie 
between NPV and DCF on the one hand and shareholder value maximization on the 
other is the issue we investigate now.   
First, let us explore the existence of a relation between shareholder value 
maximization and the use of NPV.  The necessary evidence is reported in the table we 
have just discussed (Table 5).  Column (1) shows that the coefficient of the variable 
bSHAREMAX, which identifies the firms that claim to maximize shareholder value, 
is insignificantly different from zero.  Hence in the full sample there is no relation 
between the goal of shareholder value maximization and the use of NPV.  This 
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finding is at odds with what we would expect, since NPV gives managers a measure 
of value added that is relevant in the quest for higher shareholder value.  There is no 
relation either between the goal of stakeholder value maximization (as indicated by 
the variable bSTAKEMAX) and the use of NPV.  This finding is more in line with 
our expectations, since there is no logical reason why firms that claim to maximize 
stakeholder value would rely on NPV.  The stakeholder value maximization target has 
no obvious operational interpretation and is therefore consistent with any metric used 
to decide on firm acquisitions or sales.   
The finding of no relation between adherence to a shareholder or stakeholder 
value maximization target and NPV use does not depend on whether the firm is listed.  
We can tell so by examining columns (2) and (3) of the table.  In neither column are 
the coefficients of the two variables bSHAREMAX and bSTAKEMAX significant at 
customary levels of confidence.  The same conclusion follows when we replicate the 
regressions in Table 5 by focusing on the use of NPV in large projects (not shown).   
In Table 6, we examine the relation between the targets of shareholder and 
stakeholder value maximization with the DCF firm value metric.  We do so within a 
logistic regression framework similar in spirit to that used in Table 5.  The dependent 
variable is the use of DCF in firm valuation, whereas the independent variables 
include whether the firm uses NPV, whether it is listed, its size, and whether it 
maximizes shareholder or stakeholder value.   
 
((insert Table 6)) 
 
Column (1) refers to the full sample.  Firms that use NPV are also more likely to 
use a DCF firm-valuation approach.  The column also shows that the odds of a firm 
using a DCF valuation approach increase if the firm is listed—the coefficient of 
bLISTED is positive and significant with confidence better than 0.95.  This could be 
because the DCF valuation approach is easier to implement for listed companies, and 
because listed companies are more likely to be acquisition targets of listed firms than 
of unlisted ones.  The positive and marginally significant coefficient reported for firm 
size (LNSIZE) would seem to have a similar interpretation.  Large firms are more 
likely to use DCF because they are more likely to acquire listed firms.   
The remaining two regression coefficients reported in column (1) are the ones of 
most relevance here.  The one associated with shareholder value maximization 
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(bSHAREMAX) is positive and marginally significant with 0.90 confidence in a one-
sided test against zero.  The implication is that shareholder value maximizing firms 
are more likely to use DCF valuation.  As mentioned before, this is what one would 
expect, since DCF helps identify acquisition and sale opportunities that add to 
shareholder value.  The second coefficient is associated with the variable 
bSTAKEMAX and is negative and statistically significant with 0.99 confidence.  
Accordingly, firms that claim to maximize stakeholder value are significantly less 
likely to use a DCF valuation approach.  There is no reason for managers to be 
concerned about value added if they pursue a target of stakeholder value 
maximization.   
Column (2) of the table duplicates the estimation for the unlisted firms.  The 
results are very similar to those obtained for the full sample.  In particular, 
shareholder value maximization increases the odds that the firm uses DCF valuation, 
whereas stakeholder value maximization has the opposite effect.  The only difference 
between the two columns is that the coefficient estimates in column (2) are 
statistically almost uniformly more significant than those in column (1).  Column (3) 
then restricts its focus to the subsample of listed firms.  With the exception of the use 
of NPV, no regression argument is statistically significant with 0.90 confidence in 
either a one-sided or a two-sided test against zero.  Especially, there is no relation 
between the adoption of the shareholder value maximization target and DCF 
valuation.  This result is rather puzzling.  One possible explanation is that, since 80% 
of the listed firms claim to maximize both shareholder and stakeholder value, there 
are not enough sample firms that maximize only one or the other to perform a clean 
test of the relevance of these targets.   
 
5.4. Summary 
Overall, this section finds that firms make logical investment decisions.  If they 
use the NPV criterion, they also tend to use a DCF firm-valuation approach.  At the 
same time, they refrain from valuing firms as if they were in liquidation.  These 
methods, however, are not consistently related to the target of shareholder value 
maximization.  Specifically, firms that claim to maximize shareholder value do not 
rely more often on NPV than other firms.  They do, however, tend to use a DCF firm- 
page 24 
valuation approach more often than other firms.  In contrast, firms that claim to 
maximize stakeholder value are less likely to use a DCF firm-valuation approach.   
 
6. What managers do: The evidence 
The last question we want to answer is in many respects the most interesting: 
namely, what managers really do and how that relates to what they say.  As pointed 
out in section 2.3, firm performance is measured with abnormal stock returns.  For 
obvious reasons, the analysis can therefore be carried out only for the listed firms in 
the sample.  This is true of alternative measures of performance, including ROE and 
market-to-book ratios.  Since the sample of traded firms is rather limited, the results 
are mostly suggestive.   
We computed the abnormal stock price performance of these firms between 
January 1996 and December 2001 with the monthly intercept αi in the regression 
equation (1), cumulated over the 72 months of the period in question.27 On average, 
the sample firms lose about 16% of their stock price conditional on their systematic 
risk.  The cross-sectional variation in performance is sizable.  Firms in the bottom 
quartile of the distribution lose 62%, whereas firms in the top quartile experience an 
appreciation of 34%.  In what follows, we ask whether that variation depends on 
whether or not managers pursue a target of shareholder value maximization and on 
the methods they use.  We carry out the investigation with a robust regression of 
abnormal stock-price performance against possible determinants.  The results are 
shown in column (1) of Table 7.28  
 
((Insert Table 7)) 
 
Accordingly, firms that allegedly pursue a shareholder value maximization policy 
perform systematically better than others; the coefficient of bSHAREMAX is 
statistically greater than zero with confidence of about 0.95 in a one-sided 
                                                 
27  Only 58 firms were listed from the beginning of the period under analysis.  This explains why the 
number of observations is smaller than the number of listed firms (75) in the sample.  No firm in the 
sample was taken over, went bankrupt, or was otherwise delisted during the years in question. 
28  There are 58 listed companies with sufficient stock return data, but not all of them answered the 
relevant questions.  This explains why the number of observations differs across regression 
specifications.   
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significance test (as before, the table shows probability values for two-sided tests 
only).  A look back at what we learned about the targets managers pursue helps us 
calibrate this statement.  Given that managers pursue several targets at the same time, 
it is not clear what they really do when they say they maximize shareholder value.  If 
we take their statements at face value, however, we know what they do when they say 
they do not maximize shareholder value.  The positive coefficient of bSHAREMAX 
can therefore be interpreted as meaning that, when managers say they do not 
maximize shareholder value, stock-price performance is indeed significantly worse 
than otherwise. 
The results in column (1) also include a coefficient for the variable 
bDCFVALUATION that is positive and significant with better than 0.95 confidence.  
This suggests that firms that rely on a DCF firm-valuation approach perform better 
than others.  Given this result, it is rather surprising that the use of NPV in the 
valuation of large projects does not contribute to higher share prices; the coefficient of 
bNPVLARGE is not significant at customary levels of confidence.  We reach the 
same conclusion if we replace bNPVLARGE with bNPV, a binary variable that 
characterizes firms whose managers claim to use NPV as an investment criterion.  
The significant coefficient of bDCFVALUATION should once again be interpreted 
with caution, since the cross-sectional variation of this variable is small.   
The regression arguments also include a variable (CLOSELYHELD95) that 
measures the presence of a shareholder with more than 50% of the votes in 1995, and 
a variable (OWNERSHIPCHANGE) that measures the change in the holdings of that 
particular shareholder between 1990 and 1995.  The rationale for the inclusion of 
CLOSELYHELD95 is that a controlling shareholder has the financial incentive and 
the ability to influence managerial decisions.  The rationale for the inclusion of 
OWNERSHIPCHANGE is that a change in the controlling shareholder’s stakes might 
reflect an increased willingness to influence managerial decisions.   
These variables are included to prevent an omitted-variable bias.  The results 
suggest that the presence of a controlling shareholder has no direct bearing on 
performance (the coefficient of CLOSELYHELD95 is not significantly different from 
zero at customary levels of confidence).  There might be, however, an indirect 
influence.  As one might remember from Table 4, the presence of a controlling 
shareholder appears to tilt managers’ preferences toward the goal of shareholder value 
maximization.  And, as we have just seen, managers who disclose that preference 
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appear to perform marginally better than others.  Thus a controlling shareholder may 
affect performance because his presence induces managers to maximize shareholder 
value.  Other than this indirect effect, there is not much, according to the evidence, 
that a controlling shareholder adds to firm performance.  We are lumping all 
controlling shareholders together, however, without trying to distinguish individual 
investors from corporate shareholders, family holdings from other holdings, etc.  The 
limited number of observations in the sample discourages such distinctions.  Still, 
when we use the variable OWNERSHIPCHANGE to look at cases in which the 
holdings of the controlling shareholder have recently changed, we find a positive and 
significant relation between the size of that change and performance.  The question, of 
course, is the direction of causality.  Does the controlling shareholder’s increased 
investment induce better performance, or does anticipated better performance 
encourage larger stockholdings? 
In column (2), we replicate the regression by investigating the importance of the 
method used to measure firm value.  We do this by replacing the variable 
bDCFVALUATION with the variable bASSETVALUATION, which, as we have 
discussed above, identifies firms that assess firm value by adding up the value of a 
company’s individual assets.  All the other variables remain the same as in column 
(1).  As one can see, this specification has substantially less explanatory power than 
the preceding one: the adjusted R2 falls from 16% to 6%.  Moreover, the coefficient of 
bASSETVALUATION is not significant at customary levels of significance. 
Overall, the results uncover a weak relation between performance and pursuit of a 
policy of shareholder value maximization.  The pursuit of other targets, such as 
maximization of stakeholder value, firm profits, or customer satisfaction, has no 
apparent impact on performance (not shown).  We also observe that the methods used 
to implement a policy of shareholder value maximization can affect performance.  
The use of DCF to value firms, for instance, is associated with better performance.  
The use of NPV, however, is not. 
In Table 4, we observed that managers are more likely to identify with the goal of 
shareholder value maximization if their companies’ share prices have declined.  The 
rationale is that when stock prices drop there is more pressure to make decisions that 
benefit shareholders.  If we extend that logic, we would expect that the combination 
of share price declines and subsequent statements by managers that they want to 
maximize shareholder value should be associated with better stock price 
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performance—the implicit assumption being that investors do not perfectly anticipate 
managers’ reaction.    
To test this hypothesis, we replicate the regression specification in column (1) 
with the addition of two variables.  The first variable, bSHAREMAX*RETNEG, is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if managers say they maximize shareholder value and the 
company’s stock price has declined during the period January 1990–December 1995; 
otherwise, the variable equals 0.  The second variable, bSHAREMAX*RETPOS is 
similarly defined except for focusing on firms whose stock prices have increased 
rather than decreased.  The results are shown in column (3) of Table 7.  To avoid 
clutter, we omit the independent variable CLOSELYHELD since it has an 
insignificant coefficient.   
To interpret the results, note that, if we include the two new variables in the 
regression, we have to omit the variable bSHAREMAX, since it is a linear 
combination of the two.  This replacement partitions the sample of firms that claim to 
maximize shareholder value into those whose stock prices have fallen and those 
whose stock prices have gone up.  The new specification therefore enables us to 
interpret the weak relation between shareholder value maximization and abnormal 
stock price performance we just found.  A look at the new results in column (3) 
reveals that, with the obvious exception of the coefficients of 
bSHAREMAX*RETNEG and bSHAREMAX*RETPOS, the remaining coefficients 
are essentially the same as those reported in column (1) of the table.  Let us therefore 
focus on the coefficients of the new variables.  The coefficient of 
bSHAREMAX*RETNEG is positive and marginally significant with confidence 0.90 
in a one-sided test of difference from zero.  In contrast, the coefficient of 
bSHAREMAX*POS is statistically zero.  It is therefore the firms that have 
experienced a stock price decline in the past that drive the relation between 
shareholder value maximization and performance.  These firms appear to engage in 
activities that are beneficial to shareholders.  The remaining firms seem to conform to 
investors’ expectations and their activities do not cause abnormal returns.  Given the 
sample size (41), the weight of this evidence should not be overemphasized.  
Additional research is necessary to substantiate our conclusions.   
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7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers maximize shareholder 
value.  The investigation falls into three parts.  First, we ask managers to disclose 
what goals they pursue.  Generally, they are trying to reach many conflicting goals 
simultaneously, and shareholder value maximization is frequently and deliberately not 
one of them.  There is also some evidence that managers of firms whose stock prices 
have fallen face increased pressure to care about shareholder value. 
Second, we examine some of the tools managers adopt to reach their goals.  Our 
results show that the use of NPV correlates positively with the use of DCF.  However, 
whereas managers who rely on DCF also typically maximize shareholder value, we 
do not observe a similar relation with the use of NPV.   
Third, we study whether abnormal stock-price performance is better in firms that 
want to maximize shareholder value and use the proper tools to do so.  It should be 
stressed, however, that our sample is limited.  More data are required to buttress our 
conclusions.  According to our results, the firms of managers who want to maximize 
shareholder value achieve marginally better stock-price performance than other firms, 
particularly in firms whose share prices have fallen.  Yet the evidence about the 
relation between the adoption of the proper decision criteria and performance is 
mixed.  The use of DCF in firm valuation is associated with better abnormal stock-
price performance.  We find no such relation, however, for the use of NPV in project 
valuation. 
What can be learned from these results? The first lesson is that pursuing the target 
of shareholder value maximization, and using the appropriate tools to do so, can 
indeed increase shareholder value.  The second lesson is that managers appear to 
choose inconsistent targets because they are overconfident, lack the appropriate 
incentives to do otherwise, or fail to understand the inconsistencies.  This could mean 
they also follow illogical policies.  The inability to see that, for instance, profits and 
stakeholder value cannot be maximized at the same time as shareholder value, 
suggests that managers (particularly those of unlisted firms) are unable to see clearly 
the consequences of alternative courses of action.  By implication, one has to wonder 
about the policies these managers implement.  Of course, this conclusion rests on the 
assumption that managers understand the questionnaire and are willing to provide 
truthful answers.   
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The third lesson to draw is that managers appear to be more willing to relate to the 
goal of shareholder value maximization when stock prices drop.  This could suggest 
the presence of an incentive asymmetry.  When stock prices fall, it may be easier for 
critics to argue that serious mistakes have been committed and to ask for corrective 
action.  It is also possible that caring for shareholder value is politically more 
acceptable when shareholders have lost than when they have made money.   
The fourth lesson we can learn is that many managers (about half in the total 
sample and 25% in the sample of listed firms) are willing to state for the record that 
they intend to follow policies not necessarily in the interests of shareholders.  In some 
unlisted firms, this might simply show that the controlling manager extracts his rents 
through higher salaries or various perks rather than through cash payouts to all 
shareholders (there could be tax reasons for doing so).  Still, in many cases this 
attitude could reveal managers’ confidence that shareholders do not want or are 
unable to force them to behave otherwise, something that could occur because of the 
absence of the appropriate controls or of the appropriate legal or judicial framework.   
This managerial attitude could have several theoretical and practical implications.  
Among the theoretical implications would be that the standard principal-agent models 
of the corporation, with shareholders in the role of principals, yield inadequate 
representations of reality.  There might be as many competing principals as there are 
stakeholders in the firm (see also Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2002, and the literature 
cited therein), and no rule to rank or aggregate their preferences.  One practical 
implication is that it would be difficult to hold managers accountable for their 
decisions, since, in the absence of a single-valued objective function and with no 
criteria for resolving tradeoffs among the corporation’s goals, it is not clear what 
managers should and should not do (Jensen, 2001).   
Yet another practical implication is that firms whose managers claim to maximize 
shareholder value experience somewhat better share-price performance.  This seems 
to occur because managers react to stock price declines with corrective actions.  
Actual performance therefore appears to correspond to intentions.  Whether, as many 
critics maintain, that occurs at the expense of other stakeholders in the firm is 
currently under investigation in a separate research project. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Managerial targets 
 
The table reports the frequency with which managers claim to pursue a given target.  Numbers in 
parentheses refer to the number of firms willing to state an opinion.  For instance, 68 listed firms have 
disclosed their opinion concerning maximization of customer satisfaction, and 94.1% of these firms say 
they actually pursue that particular target.  The sample year is 1998. 
 
 All Firms Listed Firms 
Answers provided 
by the CFOs, 
Treasurers, and 
Controllers 
Maximization of customer 
satisfaction 
95.9% 
(295) 
94.1% 
(68) 
96.2% 
(210) 
Maximization of stakeholder 
(shareholders, employees, 
customers, environment, etc.) value 
80.6% 
(294) 
87.7% 
(65) 
80.9% 
(209) 
Maintaining independence 78.7% (291) 
79.7% 
(64) 
75.7% 
(206) 
Profit maximization 68.2% (286) 
71.0% 
(69) 
69.8% 
(202) 
Maximization of shareholder value 
without expropriating other 
stakeholders 
57.0% 
(284) 
75.0% 
(64) 
58.9% 
(197) 
Maximization of market share 55.5% (281) 
48.4% 
(64) 
56.1% 
(65) 
 
 
Table 2 
Number of maximization targets allegedly pursued by any one firm 
 
The table shows the percentage of answering firms that pursue a given number of targets.  The targets 
in question are those reported in Table 1.  The sample year is 1998. 
 
Number of maximization targets Full sample of answering firms 
(313) 
Listed answering firms 
(75) 
0 or more 100.0% 100.0% 
1 or more 99.0% 98.7% 
2 or more 95.2% 93.3% 
3 or more 85.3% 82.7% 
4 or more 64.9% 65.3% 
5 or more 40.3% 38.7% 
6 18.5% 21.3% 
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Table 3 
Shareholder vs.  stakeholder value maximization 
 
The table reports the frequencies with which managers pursue two targets: shareholder and stakeholder 
value maximization.  The sample year is 1998. 
 
We maximize stakeholder (shareholder, 
employee, customer, environment, etc.) value   
yes no 
Total 
yes 133 18 151 We maximize 
shareholder value  no 82 39 121 
Total 215 57 272 
Pearson χ2 16.729 (0.000)   
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Table 4 
Relation between shareholder value and stakeholder value maximization targets 
 
The table examines the relation between the target of shareholder value maximization and that of 
stakeholder value maximization, using the 1998 survey as a basis.  The investigation is performed with 
a logistic regression.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable, bSHAREMAX, equal to 1 if 
managers say they maximize shareholder value, and equal to 0 if they do not say so.  Each column 
reports the estimated regression coefficients for one particular specification and (in parentheses) the 
associated p-value for a two-sided test of difference from zero. 
 
Logistic regression coefficients 
Dependent variable: bSHAREMAX 
Independent variables 
All firms 
(1) 
Listed firms 
(2) 
Listed firms 
(3) 
Listed firms 
(4) 
Unlisted 
firms 
(5) 
Constant –1.085 (0.058) 
–2.796 
(0.130) 
–5.637 
(0.021) 
–12.419 
(0.008) 
–0.724 
(0.251) 
bSTAKEMAX 1.217 (0.000) 
0.518 
(0.528) 
2.080 
(0.100) 
2.909 
(0.119) 
1.354 
(0.000) 
bLISTED 0.849 (0.026)     
LNSIZE 0.033 (0.729) 
0.490 
(0.052) 
0.621 
(0.025) 
0.982 
(0.034) 
–0.057 
(0.587) 
bCLOSELYHELD95   2.619 (0.030) 
4.370 
(0.033)  
bRETNEG    2.989 (0.034)  
RETPOS    5.120 (0.020)  
      
Cox & Snell R2  0.088 0.082 0.195 0.376 0.072 
Overall percentage of 
correctly predicted 
cases 
64.4% 75.0% 73.2% 68.3% 61.7% 
Number of 
observations 270 56 56 41 214 
 
Variable Definitions  
bSTAKEMAX Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s management says it wants to 
maximize stakeholders’ value, and equal to 0 otherwise.  Stakeholders 
include shareholders, employees, customers, and the environment; 
bLISTED Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the Swiss Stock 
Exchange, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the number of firm 
employees; 
bCLOSELYHELD95 Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has a shareholder with more than 
50% of the votes in 1995, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bRETNEG Binary variable equal to 1 if the company’s stock return is negative 
during January 1990–December 1995, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
RETPOS Variable equal to the company’s stock return during  
January 1990–December 1995 if that return is positive; otherwise, the 
variable is equal to 0. 
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Table 5 
Relation between project valuation criteria and firm valuation approaches 
 
The table examines the relation between project valuation criteria and firm valuation approaches.  The 
analysis is based on the survey of 1998 and is performed with a logistic regression.  Each column 
reports the estimated regression coefficients for one particular specification and (in parentheses) the 
associated p-value for a two-sided test of difference from zero.  The dependent variable is bNPV, a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if managers claim to use NPV when making investment decisions, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.   
 
Independent variables 
Logistic regression coefficients 
Dependent variable: bNPV 
 All firms Unlisted firms Listed firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant –1.943 (0.010) 
–1.487 
(0.069) 
–4.738 
(0.066) 
bASSETVALUATION –0.723 (0.015) 
–0.849 
(0.009) 
0.059 
(0.942) 
bDCFVALUATION 0.815 (0.012) 
0.666 
(0.053) 
1.921 
(0.057) 
bLISTED 0.751 (0.087)   
LNSIZE 0.223 (0.050) 
0.169 
(0.179) 
0.550 
(0.094) 
bSHAREMAX –0.124 (0.688) 
–0.163 
(0.627) 
0.219 
(0.802) 
bSTAKEMAX 0.556 (0.158) 
0.559 
(0.194) 
0.434 
(0.670) 
    
Cox & Snell R2  0.142 0.088 0.176 
Overall percentage of correctly 
predicted cases 67.1% 65.5% 78.6% 
Number of observations 213 171 42 
 
Variable Definitions  
bNPV Binary variable equal to 1 if management claims to use NPV when 
making investment decisions, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bASSETVALUATION Binary variable equal to 1 if managers say they value firms by looking at 
the value of their individual assets, and equal to 0 otherwise;  
bDCFVALUATION Binary variable equal to 1 if management says they value firms with a 
DCF approach, equal to 0 otherwise; 
bLISTED Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the Swiss stock 
exchange, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the number of firm 
employees; 
bSHAREMAX Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s management says it wants to 
maximize shareholder value, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bSTAKEMAX Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s management says it wants to 
maximize stakeholder value (shareholders, employees, customers, 
environment, etc.), and equal to 0 otherwise. 
page 36 
Table 6 
Relation between DCF firm valuation and shareholder value maximization  
 
The table examines the relation between the DCF firm valuation method and the target of shareholder 
value maximization.  The analysis is based on the survey of 1998 and is performed with a logistic 
regression.  Each column reports the estimated regression coefficients for one particular specification 
and (in parentheses) the associated p-value for a two-sided test of difference from zero.  The dependent 
variable is bDCFVALUATION, a dummy variable equal to 1 if managers say they use a DCF approach 
when valuing firms, and equal to 0 if they do not say so.   
 
Independent variables Logistic regression coefficients 
Dependent variable: bDCFVALUATION 
All firms Unlisted firms Listed firms  
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.202 (0.773) 
–0.021 
(0.977) 
9.061 
(0.795) 
bNPV 0.890 (0.004) 
0.780 
(0.019) 
2.066 
(0.048) 
bLISTED 0.912 (0.063)   
LNSIZE 0.139 (0.223) 
0.166 
(0.176) 
–0.007 
(0.984) 
bSHAREMAX 0.420 (0.180) 
0.605 
(0.073) 
–1.387 
(0.265) 
bSTAKEMAX –1.443 (0.002) 
–1.411 
(0.003) 
–7.829 
(0.822) 
    
Cox & Snell R2  0.135 0.095 0.178 
Overall percentage of correctly 
predicted cases 68.5% 63.4% 84.1% 
Number of observations 219 175 44 
 
Variable Definitions  
bDCFVALUATION Binary variable equal to 1 if management says it values firms with a 
DCF approach, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bNPV Binary variable equal to 1 if management claims to use NPV when 
making investment decisions, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bLISTED Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the Swiss stock 
exchange, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE Natural logarithm of firm size, measured by the number of firm 
employees; 
bSTAKEMAX Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s management says it wants to 
maximize stakeholder value (shareholders, employees, customers, 
environment, etc.), and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bSHAREMAX Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s management says it wants to 
maximize shareholder value, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7 
Relation between stock price performance, firm targets, and valuation methods  
 
The table examines the relation between stock-price performance, the targets managers claim to pursue, 
and the valuation methods they use when making investment decisions.  The analysis is based on the 
l998 survey.  The investigation is performed with an ordinary least squares regression.  The dependent 
variable, abnormal stock price performance, is the intercept estimate (cumulated over 72 months) in the 
following regression equation:  
 
 ( ) itFtMtiiFtit εRRβαRR +−×+=− , 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
 
itR  = the continuously compounded return on the stock of firm i during month t; 
FtR  = the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return during month t; 
MtR  = the continuously compounded return on the Morgan Stanley Composite Index 
Europe 15 (MSCI-E 15); 
itε  = a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant 
variance; 
iα  and iβ  = the regression intercept and slope coefficients, respectively. 
 
The regression is estimated with monthly data over the period January 1996–December 2001 with the 
robust regression approach implemented in the statistical package Stata 7.  Each column in the table 
reports the estimated regression coefficients for one particular specification and (in parentheses) the 
associated p-value for a two-sided test of difference from zero. 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Constant –1.345 (0.002) 
–0.663 
(0.043) 
–1.373 
(0.002) 
bSHAREMAX 0.381 (0.108) 
0.375 
(0.167)  
bSHAREMAX*RETNEG   
0.474 
(0.124) 
bSHAREMAX*RETPOS   
0.265 
(0.305) 
bNPVLARGE 0.057 (0.792) 
0.133 
(0.582) 
–0.028 
(0.899) 
bPAYBACKLARGE    
bDCFVALUATION 0.861 (0.032)  
0.862 
(0.032) 
bASSETVALUATION  –0.057 (0.825)  
CLOSELYHELD95 –0.248 (0.548) 
0.025 
(0.955)  
OWNERSHIPCHANGE 1.148 (0.017) 
0.939 
(0.064) 
1.041 
(0.021) 
    
F-value 2.721 (0.033) 
1.557 
(0.196) 
2.445 
(0.052) 
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.062 0.150 
Number of observations 45 42 41 
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Variable Definitions  
bSHAREMAX Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm’s management says it wants to 
maximize shareholder value, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bSHAREMAX*RETNEG Binary variable equal to 1 if managers say they maximize shareholder 
value and the company in question experiences a negative return during 
January 1990–December 1995; otherwise, the variable is equal to 0; 
bSHAREMAX*RETPOS Binary variable equal to 1 if managers say they maximize shareholder 
value and the company in question experiences a positive return during 
January 1990–December 1995; otherwise, the variable is equal to 0; 
bNPVLARGE Binary variable equal to 1 if management says NPV is the deciding 
criterion for large investment projects, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
bASSETVALUATION Binary variable equal to 1 if management says it values firms by 
looking at the value of their individual assets, and equal to 0 otherwise;  
bDCFVALUATION Binary variable equal to 1 if management says it values firms with a 
DCF approach, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
CLOSELYHELD95 Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has a shareholder with more than 
50% of the votes in 1995, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
OWNERSHIPCHANGE Change in the percentage stake of the shareholder with more than 50% 
of the votes between 1990 and 1995. 
 
 
